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1MEMORY
A Self-Referential Account
ABSTRACT
This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interest-
ing from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of 
other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other 
mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capac-
ity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories 
of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that 
beliefs formed on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of 
misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity 
other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It 
proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past per-
ceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a 
particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal ori-
gin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the 
experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our 
own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also 
accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of 
the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several 
philosophically interesting aspects of memory.
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31 Problems of Memory
ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 sets up the discussion that will lead to an account of memory and 
addresses some preliminary methodological issues. It specifies the kind of memory 
to be accounted for, as well as the features of memories of that kind which require 
explanation. These include one feature concerning the metaphysics of memory, one 
feature concerning its intentionality, two features concerning the phenomenology 
of memory, and two features concerning its epistemology. The chapter then distin-
guishes several ways in which those features can be approached, depending on which 
of them are taken to be basic. Finally, one of the possible approaches is selected for 
the book. According to this approach, the facts in virtue of which a mental state 
qualifies as a memory, and the content that the memory has, are fundamental aspects 
of that memory. The phenomenological and epistemological aspects of the memory 
are to be explained in terms of them.
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42 The Metaphysics of Memory
ABSTRACT
Chapter 2 offers a proposal about the facts in virtue of which a mental state qualifies 
as a memory. According to this proposal, a mental state qualifies as a memory in 
virtue of the functional role that it plays within the cognitive economy of the sub-
ject. The chapter outlines two alternative proposals about the nature of memory. 
According to the causal theory of memory, a mental state is a memory in virtue of 
the fact that it has been caused by a perceptual experience of some fact. According to 
the narrative theory of memory, a mental state is a memory in virtue of the fact that 
the subject is using the mental state to construct a story of their life. It is argued that 
the functionalist proposal enjoys the virtues of each of the two theories, and it avoids 
the difficulties which threaten the two theories as well.
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53 The Intentionality of Memory
ABSTRACT
Chapter 3 offers a proposal about the kind of content that memories have. According 
to this proposal, memories are self-referential in that they represent their own causal 
origin. A memory represents that it causally originates in a perception of an objective 
fact. The chapter outlines three alternative proposals about the content of memories; 
the proposal that memories only represent objective facts in the past, the proposal 
that they only represent past perceptual experiences of those facts, and the proposal 
that they represent both things. It is argued that the self-referential proposal enjoys 
the virtues of each of the three views, and it avoids the difficulties which threaten the 
three views as well.
KEYWORDS
content
intentionality
truth-conditions
intuitions
self-reference
John Searle
64 The Experience of Time
ABSTRACT
Chapter 4 offers an account of two feelings in memory. One of them is the awareness 
of what it was like for one to experience, in the past, what one is remembering in 
the present. An attempt to explain this feeling in terms of the notion of mental time 
travel is considered, and dismissed on the grounds that it presupposes a misguided 
conception of mental time travel. The other is the feeling of pastness; the feeling that 
what one is remembering is in the past. Two attempts to explain this feeling in terms 
of the content that memories have are considered, and dismissed on the grounds that 
they presuppose wrong conceptions of mnemonic content. Eventually, both feelings 
are explained through the causally self-referential content that memories have. It is 
argued that memories have both feelings because they represent perceptual experi-
ences and a causal relation between those perceptual experiences and themselves.
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75 The Experience of Ownership
ABSTRACT
Chapter 5 offers an account of the feeling that one has, when one remembers some-
thing, that the memory that one is having is one’s own. The chapter discusses the case 
of patient R.B., who claims to have memories which do not feel to him as if they are 
his own. A hypothesis about the experience that this patient is undergoing is consid-
ered. According to it, patient R.B. lacks the feeling of being identical with a past per-
son. It is argued that this hypothesis is in tension with some details in patient R.B.’s 
reports. An alternative hypothesis is proposed, according to which patient R.B. does 
not experience his memories as matching the past. It is argued that, more generally, a 
memory is experienced as one’s own just in case it is experienced as fitting. This idea 
is generalized to states of other types, such as thoughts and actions.
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86 Immunity to Error through 
Misidentification
ABSTRACT
Chapter 6 offers an account of an epistemic feature of memories; their immunity to 
error through misidentification. When one judges that one experienced something, 
based on a full and accurate memory, it is not possible for one to be wrong because 
one has misidentified the person who one remembers to have had the experience as 
being oneself. Two challenges to the idea that memories have this feature are consid-
ered. One employs the notion of quasi-memory. The other one appeals to the phe-
nomenon of observer memory. It is argued that neither challenge is successful and 
that the self-referential content of memories does suggest that memory judgments 
are immune to error through misidentification. The key to this immunity concerns 
the presence of the self in the content of memories. And that presence, in turn, is due 
to the nature of perceptual content and the relation between perceptual content and 
mnemonic content.
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97 Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
ABSTRACT
Chapter 7 discusses the question of whether memory only preserves epistemic jus-
tification over time, or can also generate it. Three defenses of the view that memory 
generates epistemic justification are considered. These three defenses appeal to the 
notions of attention, abstraction, and reconstruction in memory. It is argued that 
none of the three defenses succeeds in showing that memory generates epistemic 
justification. However, it is also argued that memory does generate epistemic jus-
tification. This is due to the self-referential content that memories have. What one 
may believe on the basis of a memory, if that memory has a self-referential con-
tent, includes things that one was not in a position to believe before one utilized 
that capacity. In that sense, memory produces new grounds, or evidence, for belief 
through the process of remembering.
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